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STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL
REPORT.
The eighth annual report of the Penna.
Bar Association has been placed in the library. The report contains some interesting statistics with reference to admission
to the Bar in this state. These statistics
are published in a table showing the number of successful and unsuccessful candidates for registration and for admission to
the Bar of each County in the state. The
table shows that throughout the state,
during the year 1901, 1330 applications in
all were acted upon; 706 for registration
and 624 for admission. Of the latter, 187
were attorneys from other jurisdictions;
122 of these were admitted on the ground
of comity, 28 on results of examinations,
and 37, rejected; 539 students were registered, and 361 student candidates were admitted to the Bar. Exclusive of comity
admissions, there were 1208 applications
acted upon; 832 or 69 per cent. were from
nine counties having 20 or more applications each during the year; of the remaining 876 applications, 264 were from counties with from 10 to 20 applications each,
and the balance of 112 were from counties
each with less than 10 applications.

Exclusive of Philadelphia,- the ratios for
the state for each 20,000 inhabitants are
1.01 for admission, 1.48 for registration^
Philadelphia county leads in the numnber of admissions on law school diplomas;
Cumberland county comes next. The
presence of the University of Pennsylvania Law School in the former county and
Dickinson School of Law in the liater is
responsible for these counties leading in
those admissions, the diplomas of these
schools being accepted in the counties in
which the schools are located. In Philadelphia 78, or 59 per cent. of the 131 admissions, were on law school diplomas. In
Cumberland county 18,or 90 per cent. of the
20 students admissions, were on law school
diplomas. In Luzerne county 2, or 8 per
cent. of the 2.5 admissions, were on law
school diplomas.
In Lackawanna, Lycoming, Venango,
Lancaster counties there were no admissions on diplomas.
There evidently is not much doing in a
legal way in Sullivan, Mifflin, Juniata,
Pike and Fulton counties. In neither of
these counties were there registrations or
admissions during the year.
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ANNUAL PRIZES.

The following is a list of the prizes to be
distributed at the close of the term:
THE WILLIAMi D. BOYER PRIZES.

William D. Boyer, A. M. LL. B., an
alumnus of the school and a member of
the Lackawana County Bar, has offered
four prizes of twenty-five dollars each, for
excellence in work to be indicated by the
dean.
Prize No. 1 is offered to the Middler
that shall do the best work in the Law of
Evidence.
Prize No. 2 is offered to the Junior that
shall do the best work in the Law of Contracts.
The other two prizes can b competed
for only by members of one of the three
athletic teams, football, baseball and track.
Prize No. 3 will be given to such student of any class, having the above qualification, as passes the best examination in
the law of Torts, provided that his paper
shall not be inferior to any five submitted.
Prize No. 4 will be given to such student of any class, having the above qualification, as writes the best essay on the
Quashing of Indictments in Pennsylvania.
There must be at least three competitive
essays submitted, otherwise this prize will
not be awarded.
THE DEAN'S PRIZES.

A prize of $25 is offered to such Senior
as shall have done the best work in Constitutional Law, Federal and State.
A prize of $25 is offered to. such Junior
as does the best work in the law of Real
Property.

ITEMS OF INTEREST ABOUT THE
SCHOOL.
The Junior class was subjected to a
special examination on the intestate laws
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, on January 17th. The students residing in Pennsylvania were examined on the Pennsylvania statutes, and the students residing
in New Jersey on the statutes of that
state.
The Senior class is receiving Corporations
under Dr. Trickett, and Partnership and
Bankruptcy under Professor Hutton. Bills
and Notes will follow Corporations, and
Landlord and Tenant, and Insurance, will

be taught after the class has finished Partnership and Bankruptcy. This will be the
first class to receive instruction on the subject of Landlord and Tenant. The subject
heretofore taught instead was Quasi Contracts. The substitution of the former for
the latter subject was done at the request of
the class.

Delaney of the Senior class was seriously ill during the beginning of the
present term.
The College Dramatic Club will produce
the comedy, "Charley's Aunt," some time
next month. Flynn and Lannard of the
Middle Class have been assigned prominent parts.
The first basket ball game of this season
was played in the gymnasium, Friday
evening, January 16th, between Dickinson
and Allbright. The former won, the score
being 40 to 10. Prickett and Ammirman
were the Law men who participated. The
former played part of the second half.
During the time that he was in the game,
he threw four baskets, and his playing at
times was remarkably fast. His work has
been favorably commented upon since the
game, and it is hoped that he will be retained as a regular member of the team.
Kurtzman of the Junior Class did not return after the Christmas vacation. He
has gone into the life insurance business.
Ed. Spencer, a student at Mercersburg
Academy, was a guest of his brother
Charles of the Middle class during the
fore part of the present month.
Miss Miller of the Junior class did not
return since the Christmas vacation. She
will continue her law studies in an office
in Scranton where she resides.
Jos. Boughton, a prominent member of
the McKean County Bar, has been appointed judge of that county to succeed
Judge Morrison, who has been appointed
a member of the Superior court, to succeed
Judge Mitchell. Judge Boughton has
been a member of the McKean County Bar
for 18 years, during which time he was
twice elected District Attorney, and was
identified with some of the largest cases
that were tried by that tribunal. His son
Victor is a member of the Senior class.
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Claycomb of the Middle class is becoming prominent as a lecturer and an author.
During the summer -vacation he lectured
in the Methodist church in Alum Bank,
Pa., before a large audience. His subject
was "The Highway to Success." During
the past few weeks there appeared from
his pen in the Bedford County News an
interesting description of the Carlisle
Indian School, and its students. Accompanying the description were halftone cuts
of the school, of Major Pratt, and of several
members of the faculty.
Harvey Bu rkhouse, a member of last
year's Junior Class, who did not return
last fall, has resumed his studies with his
class since the present term began. Business interests prevented his returning until after the holidays.
Three new men have been enrolled as
members of the Junior Class since the
opening of the present term. They are:
Patterson, of Altoona, Pa; Tyler, of Port
Alleghany, Pa., and Wackerman, of York,
Pa.
Candidates for thebase ball team reported
for practice in the gymnasium, Saturday,
Dec. 17th. Wolf, Parks, Hassert, Reeser
and Setzer are the Law men who have reported. Wolf will, no doubt, be selected
to catch on the varsity team. He is a fast
and experienced player, and will considerably strengthen the team. While a student at Mt. St. Mary's College he caught
for three years on the first team there, and
since graduating from that institution be
has played with some fast amateur teams
in the vicinity of his home, Johnstown,
Pa.
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which was conducted just before the close
of the last term was comprehensive but
not difficult.
The third of the series of mid-winter
dances that is being conducted by the
Comus Club, was held in the Armory, Friday evening, January 16th. Among the"
law students who attended were: Wilson, Dively, Spencer, Benjamin, Prickett,
Hillyer, Kress, Vera, Heller, Gillespie,
Lloyd, Core, andLongbottom.
Professor
Hutton was also present.
NEWS OF THE ALUMNI.
Daniel Kline of Freeland, a member of
the class of 1901, was recently appointed
Deputy Register of Wills of Luzerne
county. His office will be in Freeland,
and his jurisdiction will comprise the
lower end of the county. Luzerne is such
a large county and it is so inconvenient
for the residents of the southern part of
the county to reach the county seat, that
the Register of Wills usually appoints a
deputy in the southern district. There is
no compensation connected with the appointment. It is always given to a lawyer,
the theory being that the amount of practice that he will receive from performing
the duties of the office will sufficiently
compensate him for his labor.
Taylor '01 was in town during the holidays. He is residing in Grand Encampment, Wyoming, and after qualifying
will practice law there. One year's residence in the state is required before applicants for admission to the bar can take the
examination. He will be eligible to take
the examination in a few months.

The Senior Class has organized a special
class in Practice. Senator Weakley has
charge of the class. One evening each
week he will lecture in the large lecture
room in the Law School.

Among the Alumni in town during the
present month were: Elmes '02; Kline '01;
Katz '01; Kern '01; Holcomb '01; Hess '01;
Thorne '02.

For general excellency in their examination in Decedent's Estates the following
members of the Middle class were honorably mentioned by Professor Hutton at
the opening of the present term: Benjamin, Hillyer, Amerman and Albertson.
Neatness of work and knowledge of the
subject were the criteria upon which the
selections were based. The examination

At the session of the Supreme Court in
Phila. this month, the following graduates
of Dickinson Law School were admitted
to practice in that Court: Katz '01 and
Tribley '98, of Phila. Co.; Haas '98, Schuylkill Co.; Glennon '96, Holcomb '01, Luzerne.
Mitchell '01 is employed in the legal
department of the Standard Oil Company.
At present he is located in West Virginia.
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Elmer Welsh, who was graduated last
June, was recently admitted to the York
county bar, having passed the examination prescribed by the court. of that
county.

Schnee, a member of last year's Middle
class, who did not return this year, was in
town during the present month. He was
admitted to the Lycoming County Bar in
November, and to the West Virginia bar
the early part of this month. He has not
yet decided where he will practice.

DELANEY and HUBLER for the defendant.
47 Pa. 300; 14 Gray 249; 93 N. Y. 12; 4
Cushing 365; 102 Mass. 329; 99 N. J. 654;
85 Pa. 293; 80 Pa. 373; 94 U. S. 469; 62 Pa.
353.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Becker brings trespass for injuries received by reason of a fall occasioned by
slipping on ice accumulated on a pavement in front of Weidner's house. It appears from the statement of facts that the
borough authorized gutters of this kind,
and Weidner to preserve his property
John '99 of Shamokin, was in town
from the drippings of the roof of his house,
for several days during the present month.
constructed a pipe along the edge of the
roof, and thence down the side of the
Geo. Brown '96 is engaged in the coal
building. The spout had a projection of
business. He is a member of a corporation
composed principally of Philadelphia capi- nine inches from the house, which was
talists. The company owns a valuable within three inches of reaching the pavetract of coal land in the vicinity of Free- ment.
By the law of falling bodies, the water
land, and has begun to mine coal from it.
would have had a sufficient velocity after it
left the orifice to strike directly on the
MOOT COURT.
pavement, and this presents the important question for the consideration of the
WM. BECKER vs. PHILLIP WELDcourt.
NER.
What are the rights of a person who is
lawfully using a pavement and is hurt by
i'?egligence-Rights of a pedestrian-Icy slipping on ice that is caused by the artisidewalk-Failureof owner to remove ficial drainage placed there by the propthe ice.
erty owner? If there was evidence on
which to base an opinion, the conclusion
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
would not be hard to reach, as it could
Weidner had for twelve years owned a then be ascertained as to whether the
house fronting on High St., and standing
plaintiff was negligent in a contributory
back one foot from the pavement. The manner or not, in attempting to walk on
waterfalling on the roof was conducted by a the pavement in its icy condition. In 12
spout to the western corner of the roof and W. N. 409, the court held that even if the
thence by a spout down the front of the borough was negligent in allowing a ridge
house to the distance of one foot above the of ice to remain on the pavement, if a
ground. The spout here had a bend, one person who was injured knew of its danarm of it stretching nine inches along the gerous condition and attempted to cross,
top of the ground and two inches above it.
when he could have avoided the accident
On January 11th, 1899, the water run- by passing out into the street, he was
ning down the pipe had spread over the guilty of contributory negligence and
pavement on its way to the gutter and had could not recover.
frozen, and Becker, while walking on the
It is argued by counsel for the defendpavement, fell on the ice and was hurt. ant that the property owner had a reasonHe brings trespass. The borough author- able time in which to remove the ice, and
ized gutters of the kind in question.
that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to show that such time has elapsed before
CARLIN and CLAYCOMB for the plaintiff.
Owners of premises must not obstruct or he can recover. We cannot agree with
impede the passage of pedestrians.
this contention. All the legislation proRobert Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N. Y.
viding and cases holding that a property
506; Pomfrov v. Village of Silver Springs,
104 N. Y. 459; McLaughlin v. City of owner has a reasonable time to remove
snow and ice from his pavement, have
Corry, 27 Pa. 109.
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teference to the accumulation of snow and
ice from natural causes, over which the
property owner had no control. But no
case has gone so far as to apply this rule if
the owner has been the direct cause of the
water falling there, by means of a mantrap, such as pipes of this kind are. Had
the defendant extended the spout to the
edge of the gutter underneath the pavement, and the same results have followed,
the above rule would apply, but since he
-saw fit to allow the water to flow across
the sidewalk in an atmosphere such as we
have in this state in January, he certainly
knew that the foot-way would at times be
dangerous- to pedestrians. As the plaintiff has fully shown that the accident occurrtd on account of the slippery condition of the sidewalk, and as his right to
the sidewalk cannot be disputed, the presumption of law is in his favor, i. e., that
he acted as a reasonable. man would act.
The burden of proof is, therefore, on the
defendant to show that the plaintiff contributed to the injury, and as he has not
offered any evidence to establish this fact,
we hold the plaintiff can recover.
The case in 192 Pa. 574, is not in point
with this case, as the person injured in
that case knew of the obstruction and
passed over it several times; besides the
chute in the above case was authorized by
the borough; in this case it was the gutter and not the means the defendant used
to convey the water to the gutter that
were authorized.
Judgment for plaintiff.
DEVER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Had rain fallen on the pavement and
frozen, or had snow fallen, it might not
have been the duty of Weidner to Becker,
to remove it. Even though a valid municipal ordinance required Weidner to remove it, it would not result that a duty
would be thereby created toward Becker.
The breach of the ordinance might expose
to the imposed penalty, but give no right
of action to Becker. City of Rochester v.
Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405; Tremblay v.
Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 593; Hartford
v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525; 2 Dillon, Munic.
Corp. pp. 1261, 1273, 1315.
Weidner's liability, if there is any,
arises not from the fact that water fell and
froze upon his pavement, or that it was al-
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-lowed by him, after so falling and freezing, to remain upon the pavement, but
from the fact that he caused it to fall
on the pavement. The rain dripping on
his roof was thrown into the spout along
its edge, and thence conducted in a stream
to the pavement below, over which it was
thus caused to spread, and on which to
freeze.
If he had, in freezing weather, thrown
several tubfulls of water over the pavement, he would have been liable to such as,
in the careful use of the payment, suffered
harm. He as clearly causes the roof
water to come on the pavement, as if he
had cast it there from the tub. He has
built his roof and spout so that the water
comes to the pavement, and he has intended that it should come to the pavenient. He would have done this with
impunity in the absence of an ordinance.
had nobody been hurt in consequence.
But somebody has been hurt.
It was not very strenuously suggested
that the injury to Becker was too remote.
By no means. Any sensible man would
anticipate that in cold weather, water on
the pavement would freeze,-that there
would be pedestrians, and that in attempting to walk on the icy portion of the
pavement, they would be in danger of
falling. Many might not fall, but if any
fall, Weidner must make reparation.
It is suggested that the borough by not
prohibiting spouts of the kind, assented
to them; nay, that it expressly authorized
them. Let us concede that it did. That
does not change the duty of Weidner
towards Becker. He has been invited to
use the foot-walk by the laying out of the
street, and the division of it into carriage
way and sidewalk. The borough cannot
so far legalize nuisances put on the pavement by individuals, as to destroy their
duties toward pedestrians, to avoid making it dangerous. An ordinance of that
import would be unreasonable, illegal and
void.
Should it be suggested that Becker
should have sued the borough, the answer
is at hand. The borough was, possibly,
negligent in allowing spouts to be so
maintained, that they would flood the
pavements with water, whioh, in cold
weather, would freeze. If it waa, it would
be liable to an action by Becker. But its
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negligence is distinct from Weidner's.
His is active; it's passive. He causes theI
water to flow on the sidewalk; it tolerates
or suffers his doing so. Each is liable for
his several act. That of one is not absorbed into the other's. Tremblay v.
Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 598.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHNSON vs. BROWN.
Constitutional law-Due process of lawLimits of the police power of a stateSeizure of gaming devices-Act of Mar.
8., 1860, P. L. 882.
STATEUENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff owned a musical slot machine,
which was summarily seized by the police
without any arrest or charge against the
owner, on the ground that it was a gambling device. It was shown that the
machine could be used for perfectly legitimate purposes, such as operation as a
music box, or to register the number of
customers, etc., but that it could be used
for certain gambling devices. The contention was that there was a taking of
property without due process of law within the constitutional inhibition.
WALSH and DELANEY for plaintiff.
The act authorizing seizure violates
XIV Amendment of the Constitution.
Mode of seizing the property is not by due
process of law.
Mycodham v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378;
Murray v. Hoboken Co., 18 Howard 272;
Brown v. Hummel. 6 Pa. 86; Maugle v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 678.
BISHOP and PEIGHTEL for the defendant.
The act is constitutional. It is exercising the police power of the State. Crary
v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399; Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, First Ed., Vol. 18 p. 75. The fact
that the machine could be used for legitimate purposes does not take it out of the
class of devices intended by the statute.
State v. Lewis, 12 Wisc. 483.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of replevin to recover
possession of a musical slot machine
which was summarily seized by the officers. We must presume that they were
acting under Act of Mar. 31, 1860, as the
ground given to justify the seizure was
that it was a gambling machine. The

Act of Mar. 31, 1860, after prohibiting various forms of gambling, and prescribing
penalties therefore, etc., declares: "It
shall be lawful for any sheriff, constable
or other officer of justice, with or without
warrant, to seize upon, secure and remove
any device or machine of any kind, character or description whatsoever, used and
employed for the purpose of unlawful gaming, as aforesaid, etc. * * * * And it shall
be the duty of such officer to make return
in writing to the next term of Quarter
Sessions of the proper county, setting
forth the nature and description of the device, and the time, place and circumstance
under which such seizure was made; and
the said court, upon hearing the parties,
if they should appear, if satisfied that such
machine was employed and used as aforesaid, shall adjudge the same forfeited.
* * *- * Andsuchadjudicationshallbe
conclusive evidence to establish the legality of such seizure in any court of this
Commonwealth in any cause in which
the question of its legality shall arise; and
in any case in which a decree of forfeiture
shall not be pronounced, if said court shall
upon the evidence, be satisfied that there
was probable cause for the seizure, they
shall certify the same, which certificate
shall be a bar to any action brought
against the officer for or on account of
such seizure in those cases in which said
officer returns or offers to return such device or machine; and in all cases shall
prevent a recovery in damages for any
sum beyond the real value of the device or
machine seized." In the above act we
have a well defined mode of procedure in
such cases as the one at bar. This action
is permature, as there has certainly been
no such adjudication as required by the
act. Either the plaintiff or defendant can
push the matter to adjudication at the
hext term of Quarter Sessions, after which
the plaintiff, in this action, will have his
remedy in either trespass or replevin if
there is not sufficient evidence to warrant
a decree of forfeiture and the court does
not certify that there was probable cause
for said seizure. We think the provisions
of the above act are clear and amply warrant us in holding that replevin will not
lie until such adjudication has been made.
See Slovlin v. Com.,.l06 Pa. 369.
Then wehave following the above section
the following section of same Act (1860):
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"No writ ofreplevin shallissue forany device or machine seized as aforesaid, nor
shall any action be instituted for or on account of such seizure until the court shall
have first adjudicated on the premises;
but such writ or action shall forthwith on
motion be quashed and abated by the
court in which it shall be sued or bought."
The constitutionality ofthe Act of March
31, 1860, has been questioned by the plaintiff, claiming it deprives a person of his
goods without due process of law, which is
prohibitedbytheU. S. Constitution. Lord
Coke says that the words "Per Legem
Terrae" means by due process of law and
beig brought into court to answer according to law. We find this statement
in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p.
362. Nor can a party by his misconduct
so forfeit a right that it may be taken
from him without judicial proceedings in
which the forfeiture shall be declared in
due form. The words "due process of
law" must be understood to mean that no
person shall be deprived by any form of
government action of either life, liberty
or property, except as the consequence of
some judicial proceeding appropriately
and legally conducted. Weynhawser v.
The People, 3 Kerrian. We are of the
opinion after a consideration of the above
authorities that "due process of law" is
provided for in the Act of March 31, 1860,
and as it has stood so long without being
declared unconstitutional we think it is
entirely in harmony with the provisions
of said constitution. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that the writ of replevin
should be quashed and is hereby quashed.
EBBERT, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It is conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, unless the 60th and 61st
sections of the act of March 31, 1860, 1 P.
& L. 1218, prevent. We omit a quotation
of these sections.
It will barely be questioned that the
legislature may authorize the taking and
confiscating of property used or intended
to be used for illegal purposes, e. g.,
liquors, gambling devices, burglars' tools.
If it can fine $500 or $1,000 it can also forfeit specific property.
The device in this case is a "musical
slot machine" and it can be put to legitimate as well as to illegitimate uses. But,

if it was in fact being put or being intended immediately to be put to illegitimate uses, it can be confiscated. Such
has been held with regard to nets, used in
unlawful fishing. Lawton v. Steele, 152U.
S. 133; or to oleomargarine, Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; or liquors,
kept for the purpose of unlawful sale,
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. The
,penalty of loss of ownership of the res, is
no more objectionable than any other
penalty. Of. Long v. Rainivater, 70 Mo.
152.
The act of 1860 authorizes the seizure of
the articles without a warrant. The requirement of a warrant is inter alia for
the purpose of obtaining the responsibility
of some other person than the officer, for
the existence of a probable cause. But an
officer can at common law, arrest without
warrant in certain cases. The constitutional principle found in section 8, Art. 1,
of the state constitution, does not preclude
the extension of the officer's power thus to
arrest or to seize, to cases similar to this.
Had the act of 1860 authorized the officer, on his own opinion of the nature or
destination of the slot machine, to destroy
it, it would probably have been unconstitutional; the owner, in that case, would
have been deprived of his property without the adjudication of a judicial officer of
any kind. Allowing him in a subsequent
action against the officer, to show that
the property was not of the sort of which
it was assumed by the officer to be, and,
if he showed it, to recover damages, would
not satisfy the constitutional requirement.
The owner cannot be deprived of his property on the mere chance of getting compensation for it from one from whom compensation may not be able to be wrung by
fi.fa. or capias. Of. Wendt v. Craig, 67
Pa. 424; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399; Philada.
v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80.
The act of 1860 requires the officer to
make return of the seizure to the next
Court of Quarter Sessions. That court is to
hear the parties, and is then to determine whether the device was used for unlawful gaming. If the decision is that it
was so used, it is to be destroyed ; other
wise it is to be restored to the owner.
The owner is to be dispossessed simply,
until the hearing. His final loss of the
-property through its destruction, depends
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on the conclusion of the court.

Is the

the first section of the 14th Amendment of

provision adequate?
the Federal Constitution. Infringement
No trial by jury is provided, but, while
of this amendment must be found, if at all,
the constitution of the State ordains that
(a) in the annexation of the result of dethe right of trial by jury shall be as here- struction to the having, for gambling purtofore, there always have been modes of
poses, of a slot-machine, or (b) in the pro
trial of facts which did not include the
vision for asoertaining the fact by a judge.
employment of a common law jury. The
We find no prohibition upon states,
liability of a county or city for destruction
against making all property used for ilby mobs, can be assessed without such a
licit purposes forfeit and dooming it to dejury; In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa. 204.
struction. The state can forbid the proThe forfeiture of loose logs allowed to
duction of beer, wine or oleomargarine or
float down the Susquehanna, can be inthe having it for the purpose of sale, under
flicted by a justice of the peace without a
a penalty of destruction. It matters not
jury. Wendt v. Craig, 67 Pa. 424. Cf.
that the substance is capable of effecting
Van Swarton v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa.
some useful and desirable objects. The
130. In Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa.
mischief to be apprehended from its con366, it seems to have been conceded that a
tinued existence, may, in the judgment of
board of health could abate nuisances at
the legislature, exceed the good. Though
the expense of individuals, and make
the musical slot machine may serve es a
its judgment as to the fact that the things music box, or to register the number of
alleged to be, were in fact nuisances, concustomers, this will not compel the legiselusive. Cf. Philada. v. Provident, etc.
lature to tolerate it, if it may be and in fact
Trust Co.. 132 Pa. 224; Byers v. Commonis used for illicit purposes. The state may
wealth, 42 Pa. 89. We think that the
deem it better to do without the possible
trial of the fact in question, could be degood, in order to escape the probable evil.
puted to the court sitting without'ajury.
The requirement of "due process of law"
The constitutional provision that nodoes not make a trial by jury necessary.
body shall be deprived of his property
Says Cooley, whom for bonvenience we
without due process of law, is invoked.
may here quote, "The states, therefore,
The 9th section of Art. 1, of the state conmay prescribe their own modes of proceedstitution, enacts "nor can he (j. e. one acing and trial; the accusation may be by
cused of crime) be deprived of his life, lib- grand jury or withobt one; the trial by
erty or property, unless by the judgment
jury or by.court." Const. Law 245.
of his peers or the law of the land." This
It does not appear whether the replevin
clause is not applicable to the case before
was begun before the close of the next
us. The proceeding is not founded on the
session of the Quarter Sessions or not.
guilt of Johnson. The use of the machine
We must assume that it was, and for this'
may have been by another than the
reason we think the decision of the learned
owner, by a lessee, or borrower. Besides,
court below correct. Had the policeman
it does not appear that Johnson has been
neglected to make return to this court as
accused.
We do not understand that the
the act of 1860 requires, it is probable that
officer could not seize the machine withhe would become a trespasser ab initio,
out also arresting the person who was operand that Johnson could recover the slot
ating it. But, even if the clause quoted is
machine in this replevin. The prohibition
applicable, it simply requires the judg- in the 61st section of -the act of 1860 was
ment of Johnson's peers, or the law of the
intended to prevail, only when the officer
land. The law of the land does not alcomplied with the directions of the 60th
ways prescribe, as we have seen, a trial
section, and invoked in due time, the
by peers, i. e. by jurors. To condemn to
judgment of the court.
forfeiture by a judge, is to condemn acJudgment affirmed.
cording to the "law of the land" in a contitutional sense.
But the objection to the act is, that it
provides for a depriving of property without due process of law i. e., in defiance of
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WHITE vs. PA. ROLLING MILL CO.
Bill in equity-Circulation of portraitRight of privacy-Jurisdictionof equity
-Bill dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Complainant, a beautiful young lady,
files a bill against the defendant company
and asks the court that the said company
be restrained and enjoined from circulating
her portrait in the shape of lithographic
prints, for the purpose of advertisement.
The prints were upon flour sacks with the
words below, "Our Pride" and above the
same, "Penna. Rolling Mill Co." There
were no contractural relations between
the parties, and it is not known just how
the company came into possession of the
portrait, but it was not with the consent or
-with the approval of the complainant. It
is not contended that the portrait is libelous. Complainant alleges that she has
been humiliated and her good name injured, causing distress of mind and body
by reason of the above fact.
SHEBBINE and WRIGHT for the complainant.
Courts recognize the right of property in
pictures and will restrain publication by
others than the owner. 16 Am. and Eng.
Enc. of L. 442.
Equity will interfere to prevent a violation of personal legal rights. Pollard v.
Photographic Co., L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 345;
Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. R. 434.
BOuTON for the defendant.
The right of privacy has been specifically denied. Robertson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N. E. Rep. 442. Plaintiff must recover, if at all, at common law,
and there is no recovery in absence of libel.
Atkinson v. J. E. Doherty & Co., 48 L.
R. A. 220; Cooley, Const. Lim., 6th Ed.,
518.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It was with some hesitation that the
Court finally decided to dismiss the bill of
the complainant in this suit. A doubt
arose as to whether or not weight of authority and long established precedents should
not be disregarded and the case be decided
upon principle. The issue was decided, as
frequently before, by principle giving way
to precedent.
In 124 U. S., 210, it was said that the office and jurisdiction of a court of equity,
unless enlarged by express statute, were
limited to the protection of the rights of

property. This has long been the rule both
in the English and the American Courts,
and although we admit a tendency in the
American Courts to go further in the protection of one's rights, it has only been in
cases where the injury complaued of is of
a material nature and not a mere injury to
the feelings, as appears in the present suit.
It was expressly laid down in a case reported in 46 L. R. A., 219, that an injury
to the feelings was a wrong for which the
law afforded no remedy.
The complainant also contends that right
of privacy is a form of property and as such
is and has been protected. The cases in
which such a right was protected were
those involving a breach of contract, trust
or confidence, three elements which do not
enter into the case at bar. A case tried in
New York and ieported in the American
Law School Review, presents a similar
statement of facts as appears in the suit at
bar. In rendering the majorityopinion of
the Court, Justice Parker said that "the
'so-called right of privacy' has not yet
found an abiding place in our jurisprudence." We think that the law laid down
in that suit was but the re-affirmance of an
established precedent. Thecaseon which
complainant mainly relies is that of Corliss v. Walker, reported in 31 L. R. A.,
283. We are of the opinion that this case
is not in point and will not support their
contention. It appears by the report of
that case that the injunction was granted
because of the breach of conditions annexed to the contract. That part of Justice Colt's opinion cited by the complainant
we think is merely dicta, and doubt that
it is supported by the weightof authority.
It has been decided that equity has no
power to restrain a libelous publication,
surely, then, afortiori,it would not have
the power to enjoin one not alleged to be
libelous.
Still another potent reason for refusing
to allow the bill in this suit is the fact that
by the Constitution of the U. S. freedom
of speech and of thdpress is granted, whereby the publication of any article or anything is allowed just so long as such publication is not in violation of the laws of
society respecting blasphemy, decency,
etc., and does not amount to a public offense
or cause material injury to other persons,
none of which is alleged in the case at bar.
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As stated supra, we are of the opinion,
arrived at with some hesitancy, but
founded on the weight of authority, that
the bill should be dismissed and the conplainant pay the costs.
Judgment affirmed.
KRESS, J.
OPINTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The first question, in this case, is has
the defendant violated and is it threatening to violate any right of the plain tift? It
is vaguely suggested that the plaintiff has a
right of "privacy," a right "to belet alumne,"
and that in some way this right is violated by the acts of the defendant.
What is "privacy ?" Miss White can, if
she wishes to, seclude herself. Shemay refuse to receive visitors, refrain from appearance on the street, in church, in the ballroom, in the theatre. She may refrain
from writing or speaking, or otherwise
acting in the presence of others, and thus
conceal her emotions and thoughts. This
privacy has not been violated.
Has Miss White the right to go to
church or upon the street, without being
seen? Must others avert or close their
eyes, lest they fall upon her visage, and
retinal pictures are obtained from it,
which translate themselves into visions,
sights of her?
She cannot well live at all except in an
East Indian Zenana, without having pictures of her face made in the minds of her
fellow-creatures, be that face beautiful or
ugly, a cause of admiration or of disgust.
The very pigs and dogs on the street
steal impressions of it, as they turn their
glances upon her, but she has no redress
for this degradation of her divine features.
If she wishes to prevent pictures of herself
in swines' eyes, she must take care not to
come into the range of those eyes. No
chancellor will assist her.
But, pigs are not printers, and dogs do
not practice photography. It is supposed
that while she cannot compel her fellowmen to close their eye$ as she passes, so
that they may not see her, she has a right
that they shall not assist others, who do
not see her, to form images of her appearance. She wants to limit the publication
of her face. to the very persons to whom
she shows it. But has she such a right?
There are two ways by which others can
receive notions of her face, pictorial .and

graphical. A delineation byphotography,
or engraving, or painting. A verbal description may be made.
We have not understood that, when one
has seen a fellow-creature's face, be it
beautiful or ugly, he is by law forbidden to
describe it, ever so vividly, accurately, and
realistically. He can describe it to one or
20, or 1000, or 10,000 people. No English
court has heretofore laid a fetter on the
tongue or the pen merely to prevent its
truly describing a human countenance.
Nor can it matter before what audience
the description is given.
What is the difference between a picture
and a description, except that the former
awakens an image in the mind without
the aid of imagination, while the latter
simply stimulates the imagination through
the word-associations and that the realization of the actual face through the former
is more complete and firm, than through
the latter? It is safe to say that no right
has thus far been recognized, in the owner
of a face, that an image of it shall not be
fashioned in other minds through pictures
of it, or descriptions of it.
The common law has dealt with the
subject and by the limitations it has prescribed indicates pretty clearly what sort
of right to privacy in this regard there
shall be. The truth at common law was
no protection to a pictorial representation
that would expose one to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, etc. Occasionally nature afflicts
people with oddities and imperfections
that produce laughter or contempt, or
disgust, and the publication of representations of these oddities and imperfections
would not bejustified by its veracity. But,
the common law did not prohibit and
punish publications of pictures of men that
evoked praise, admiration, homage.
But, the recognition by common law of
an alleged right is not necessary to its
existence. The chancellor, from time to
time created rights, or as he would sometimes prefer saying, furnished remedies
for already existing rights, which had been
recognized to exist, neither by statute nor
by the common law, and the effort now
is, to induce the chancellor either to create
and protect a new right, or to protect what
he may be pleased to declare to be an old
right that has never yet had definition or
defence in the law.
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It is a fashion, nowadays, when any
body discovers what ought to be, in his
judgment, a right, to appeal to the court of
equity to make it such. It was very well,
in centuries when parliaments were infrequent, and when the topics with which
they dealt were few, and the mass of their
legislation extremely small, according to
modern standards, to ask the chancellor to
legislate. For political reasons, the king
would not convoke parliament, or quickly
-prorogued or dissolved it. Its time, when
it was in session, was occupied almost exclusively by matters deemed important by
the executive. But for thebeneficentusurpations of the chancellor, civilization could
not well have advanced as it did, unless,
perhaps, these very usurpations, making
parliament the less necessary, were one
-rea~on for their very infrequency and infertility.
The present conditions are very different.
We have biennial legislatures, each turning out as many statutes as wereformerl.V
created ift a half-century. Their very object, if fit object at all they have, is to watch
the course of civilization, and to adapt to
it (he institutions, laws and procedures of
the State. If a new right is to be created,
the legislature is in Harrisburg to create it.
If the time has come to recognize a socalled right of privacy, surely the legislature is the only body that can authentically declare it. To itshould beaddressed
the considerations that have been urged in
this court. If convinced that there should
be a right of privacy, let them enact it, define it, provide means civil or criminal for
defending it. That it is irksome to do this,
that success would be doubtful, is surely
no good reason for appealing to a chancellor. It is far better, if commands not to
publish physiognomies are to be issued,
that they should be directed to the people
generally, and not to a particular individual by way of rescript or ukase, that the
punisliment for violation should be knowable in advance, and not depend on the
unpredictable caprice of a chancellor, and
that, in administering the punishment the
judge should not be inflamed by any feeling'that the defendant has defied his personal authority, a feeling which is inseparable from the decree of a chancellor for
so-called "contempt." The very word is
suggestive of the point of view from which

he contemplates the delict of the defendant. More than this, it is very desirable
that the right of trial by jury should be
preserved, as it is not, when the chancellor first launches the command, then declares its infraction, and then fulminates
the penalty for contempt. It is equally
important that the constitutional maxim
against ex postfacto laws should be observed, and it is not observed, when, after
the fact, the chancellor defines the punishment.
It may doubtless be replied, that such
considerations as these would have prevented many modern and useful extensions made by the chancellors of their
jurisdiction. So they would. It is undoubted that the courts, especially the
courts of equity, have asssumed powers
from time to time, which it would hav.
been better for them to have received from
the ostensible law-maker, the legislative
branch, and the very citation of these assumptions, acquiesced iu,as justifications
for fresh ones, is one of the strongest objections to their having been made. What
then? Are we frankly to avow the principle that the chancellor can create new
rights and give remedies for them, either
openly or under the pretense of simply
recognizing old rights and applying old
remedies, or are we to adhere to the theory
of the tripartite division of functions, and
insist that not the chancellor, but the
general assembly, shall legislate? The
old law forbade pictures tending to bring
a man into contempt, etc. The proposed
new law is to forbid pictures, true to their
beautiful originals, and not tending to
bring the originals into contempt. Thus
to change the law ought surely to be undertaken by the so called law-making organ,
and not by the law-executing department
of which the courts are a branch.
It appears that over the picture of the
plaintiff, the defendant has priuted the
words "Our Pride." While the picture
itself would not be libelous, we are not prepared to say that if these words awaken
any suggestions that tend to lessen the
respect of people for the plaintiff, they
might not be treated as libelous. Words
of praise, used ironically, might be slanderous. The very fact that the defendant has
printed the face of the plaintiff, with the
words annexed, may indicate a want of
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respect, on its part, and so tend to beget a
want of respect on the part of the public,
or so expose the plaintiff to the raillery,.
chaffing, of her friends, acts which may
imply iu a mild form a lessened respect;
or may suggest a familiarity on the part of
some officer or member of the corporation
with the plaintiff that will tend to diminish the public confidence or esteem.
But, the common law has provided for the
case, if these are correct suppositions. It
has furnished a penalty, as also damages.
This is its method of prohibiting. Is the
chancellor to invent another method? If
he thinks the penalty for embezzlement
insufficient, is he to launch an injunction
against it, and punish for contempt? Or
if he thinks an action for damages would
yield an insufficient compensation, is he
for this reason to issue the injunction?
We cannot convince ,ourselves that the
plaintiff needs or can have other redress
for the libel, if libel there be, than that
provided by the law.
It is to be observed, however, that "it is
not contended that the portrait is libelous," and this, apparently, means that the
entire publication, words as well as picture, is not to be regarded as libelous.
For the reasons imperfectly indicated,
we accept the doctrineof Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, and
of the learned court below.
Decree affirmed.
CANNING CO. vs. ARTHUR FAKE.
Contracts illegal-Public policy-Rescission, wrongful appropriationof constitution, no ground for.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff" corporation desired to 'secure certain legislation at Harrisburg. It
employed the defendant to secure the passage of the bill, and gave him $5,000 to use
with members of the legislature. Instead
of so using it, he appropriated it to his
own use, and made no effort to pass the
bill. The plaintiff sues to recover the
$5,000.
HILLYER AND KNAPPENBERGER for the
plaintiff.
The contract is yet executory, hence
company may rescind. Parsons on Contracts, vol. 2, p. 146.; Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49.

Courts grant relief when parties are not
n pari delicto. H. and E. Enc., 2d ed.,
vpl. 15, p. 1004; Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U. S. 487 ; Spring Co. v. Knowlton,
supra; Adams v. Goodnow, 101 Mass. 81;
Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 368.
:UBLER for the defandant.
Courts will not enforce a contract which
is illegal, or inconsistent with sound morality or public policy. 149 Pa. St. 379; 88
Wallace, (U. S.) 561; 100 Pa. St. 561.
Contract to secure passage of an act by
payment of money to legislators, is void .s
against public policy. 5 Watts and Sargeant 315; 16 Howard U. S. 314.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be decided in this case
seems to be whether or not the plaintiff
can rescind an illegal executory contract
and recover back the $5,000 paid to defendant. A number of cases have been cited
to show that the contract in this case is
illegal, but under the view we take of the
law it will not be necessary to decide that
point.
A s far back as 1780, it was held in England by the Court of King's Bench in the
case of Lowry v. Bourdieu, 2 Doug. 468,
that there was a well defined distinction
between executory and executed contracts,
and that so long as an illegal contract remained executory, it might be rescinded
and money paid on it recovered.
In that case Justice Buller cites and approves the doctrine of a case of Walker v.
Chapman, saying: "There was a case of
Walker v. Chapman some years ago in this
court in which money had been paid to
secure a place in the customs. The place
had not been procured and the party who
paid the money having brought his action
to recover it back, it was held that he
should recover because the contract was
executory." This case seems to be parallel
with the case at bar.
In the case of White v. The Franklin
Banks, 22 Picks (Mass.) 181, this doctrine
was affirmed, and Wilde, J., in a very full
and exhaustive opinion traces the doctrine
back through the common law, concludingby saying "this was definitely settled as
the law in Anbert v. Walsh, 3 Tant 277,
and it does not appear that it has since
been doubted. The distinction seems to
be founded in wise policy,,as it has a tendency in some. measure to prevent execution of unlawful contracts and can in no
way work injustice to either party."
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In Forscht v. Green, 53 Pa. 138, and in
McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S & R. 146, it
was held that where one had deposited
money with a stakeholder on a gambling
contract he could recover it from the stakeholder by giving notice not to pay it to the
winner. The same doctrine was held in
Morgan v. Beaumont, 121 Mlass. 7.
In Peters et al v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163, and
McNaughton Co. v. Haldeman, 160 Pa.
145, it was held that where money wos
placed in a stock broker's hands on a gainbling contract, if the profits had been disposed of and nothing remained in the
hands of the broker but the amount of the
original deposit, this money might be recovered. In the former case, Justice Alitchell said "If when the first deposit was
made by the plaintiff with directions to
buy the stock, he had countermanded the
directions before anything was done under
them, it could not be pretended that the
defendant could have retained the money
on the ground of the illegality in the contemplated transaction."1
If the plaintiff in this case were seeking
to enforce an illegal contract it is plain lie
could not suceed, but as he is notseeking
to enforce it, and, on the other hand, is
seeking to rescind itand recover the moniy
paid on it, we can see no reason why I(,
should not be allowed to do so.
The contract is executory, the defendant
has done absolutely nothing toward carrying out its terms, and we think it would
he unjust and illegal to allow the defendant to keep the $5,000 paid to him by the
plaintiff.
Judgment is therefore entered for plaintiff:
WILSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Fake was employed by the company "to
secure the passage"l of a bill through the
legislature. Five thousand dollars were
given to him, not as compensation for his
own services, but to be distributed among
the members of the legislature. That such
an object was illegal, there can be no
doubt. Cf. Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5W.
& S. 315; Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa.
375; Clark, Cont. 420. On such a contract
no suit could be maintained. Fake could
not recover from the company compensation for his services, nor the company

from Fake for the neglect or unskilful and
therefore ineffectual effort of Fake to obtain the passage of the act.
There are cases which hold that, after
A has put money or other property into
B's hands, in order that B may by means
of it procure an illegal result, A may repent before the use of the money or property and sue to recover it back. A locus
poenitentiae is conceded to him. Peters
v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163. It is sounder policy
to allow the party effectively to repent,
even with the aid of the court, before the
time arrives for the improper use of the
money, than to make repentance fruitless.
But, we see no sign of repentance in the
case before us. The money was allowed
to remain with Fake during the session
of the legislature. The complaint now is,
not that he had been notified not to use it,
and to return it, but that he had "made
no effort to pass the bill," i. e. to buy
the votes necessary to pass it. What appears before us then is simply a breach of
the contract the company had fully performed, putting the money into Fake's
hands to corrupt the legislators. It then
awaited the performance by Fake of his
part of the contract. It was disappointed.
Fake thought it more profitable to him,
having the money, to spend it for his own
behoof, than upon the venial legislators
who impart to Harrisburg its carrion odor.
The company's suit is not by way- of rescission, but for the breach of the contract.
Had Fake used the money in even unsuccessful bribery, surely the company could
not audaciously expect to recover it. The
non-appropriation of it to the ends contemplated is the gravamen of the cause.
It does not appear that Fake contracted
to return so much of the $5,000 as he did
not spend. His contract was to spend it,
and he has failed to'keep his contract, in
that he did not spend it. To assist him to
recover the money, is virtually to assist
him to recover damages for the non-performance of Fake's promise. It is true
that had the promise been kept possibly
the coveted bill would have been enacted.
and possibly this bill turned into law
would have been worth to the company
$20,000. But, what the company lost was
simply the probability of the passage of the
bill, if $5,000 were spent upon ,the Harrisburg statesmen,and that probability would
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be worth less than the law itself. Whether
the $5,000 would be the maximum damage
recoverable or not, it is substantially sought
a damages. Cf. Am. & Eng. Encyc. 998,
1001.
But let us suppose that the theory on
which the action proceeds is that of rescission. An objection to it would be, that rescission is not allowed simply because of
non-performance by the opposite party.
Another is that it would be as seriously
against sound public policy to permit rescission when the contract had been illegal
and no repentance before the period of performance had supervened, as to allow an
action on the contract for non-performance.
The company had allowed the $5,000 to remain with Fake, during the session of the
legislature,in the expectation thathe would
spend it on the legislators. It Is when it
discovers that he has not done so, that it
claims the money back, instead of demanding damages for non-performance. Sout:d
policy requires that it shall take the risk,
when it makes a contract of this flagitious
sort, of the loss of all that it adventures
upon it. If it knows that, should the other
party not do what he promises, it can secure the aid of the court to compel him at
least to pay back what has been paid him,
it will be tempted to take the comparatively little hazard. Nay, the right to recover back the money may be more valuable than that to secure damages. Thus,
on a trial for damages, the jury might find
that the act, if passed, would not have beeii
worth to the plaintiff $5,000. It mightalso
find that the chances of securing the act,
even had the money been expended, would
not be worth more than one-half of the
value of the act passed. To allow the company to recover the money is to lessen the
incentives to abstain from entering into
such contracts.
To expose Fake to the danger of having
to repay the money unless he does what
he promises, is also to give him an incentive to do what he has promised, viz: to
corrupt the legislature. Surely a sound
policy requires that he should know that
whether he does what he agrees to do or
refrains from doing it, the money cannot
be taken from him.
It is well settled that if a contract is performed on both sides, however illegal,
neither party can rescind and recover back

the consideration furnished by him. There
is no good reason for holding that when it
has been performed on one side, the performing party can rescind and recover
back the consideration furnished by him.
It is"true that in the latter case the nonperforming party has an inequitable advantage over the other, but it is not for tl)e
courts to redress inequities between parties
which have arisen from a contract made
to the detriment of the public and of the
state. They should understand that they
must repose solely on the honor of their
co-contractors, and not at all upon the
coercive power of the courts. It is better
to employ a rogue to punish a confederate
rogue, than to encourage roguery by protecting one of them from the other.
Judgment reversed.
WILLIAM

THORPE vs. EDWARD
ENSTEIN.

Tort- Trespass-Nuisance-Noxiousgases
-Damage to growing crops-Jurisdiction of equity- Pa. Coal Co. v. ,Sanderson distinguishedand discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thorpe owns a parcel of land, having
acquired title to the same on April 1st,
1895.
Enstein, on April 1st, 1900, bought an adjoining tract on which was a bed of clay,
and for the purpose of manufacturing the
same into brick, he subsequently erected
a brick kiln and engaged in the making of
brick. The fuel used was stone coal.
In the summer of 1902, after the business
had been in operation for two years, a kiln
was fired and smoke and gases from same
settled upon the field of Thorpe on which
corn was growing. The corn was injured
to theextent of $50. Thorpe sues Enstein.
WILLIS and GILLESPIE for the plaintiff.
The business is a nuisance. Wood on
Nuisances, sec. 3. No man's property can
be taken directly or indirectly, without
compensation under the law of the state.
Houck v. Pipe Line, 153 Pa. 375.
If the business affects the useof property
or the health of its occupants, even though
a proper business conducted in a proper
manner, damages will be assessed. Robb
v, Carnagie, 145 Pa. 324; McKeon's v.
Lee. 51 N. Y. 500; Rylands v. Fletcher,
L. R. 3 H. L. 330; Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57
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Pa. 274; Susq. Fertilizer Co. v. Mahon, 0
L. R. A. 737: Davis v. Saylor, 1.43 Mass.
289. The measure of damages is the loss of
crops, together with permanent injuries.
Robh v. Carnagie, supra. Trespass is the
proper remedy. Huckenstein's Appeal,
70 Pa. 102.
AmF.wrAx and SHomo for the defendant.
An owner may develop the natural resources of his own land in the absence of
negligence without paying incident damages to neighboring property. Penna.
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa 162;
Harvey v. Susq. Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63;
Penna. R. R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 542;
Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267; Burnard
v. Sheley, 135 Ind. 547; Railroad v.
Oakes, 94 Tex. 155.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Action of trespass by A for injury to his
growing corn, caused by smoke and gases
from defendant B's brick kilns.
The defendant relies almost solely on
the case of Sanderson v. Penna. Coal Company, 113 Pa. 143. In this case the land
was coal land; its value could be realized
in ,Lo other way than by bringing the
coal to the surface so that it could be prepared for market. The damage was
caused by water which was found on the
land, and of necessity must be removed in
order to produce the coal. The water was
something which was found on the landput there by nature and not brought on
by the defendants.
It was discharged from the mines while
the defendants were actually developing
their own land.
The main ground for the decision was
that of necessity. The company must operate its land where the lands lie; and,
not to allow the acidulated water which
nature created to be removed and deposited
in the natural water channels, would stop
the development of the property. The discharge of water was the natural and necessary result of the development by the
owner, of the resources of his land.
The case at bar can be distinguished from
the Sanderson case in many particulars.
To those already mentioned, the folIdwing
may be added: (1) The clay had already
been taken from the land when injury
odcurred. (2) The injury complained of
was caused by smoke and gases emitted by
defendant's kilns while he was manufacturing a finished article from a raw material. (3) The defendant could have trans-
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ported the clay to a place where it could be
manufactured into brick without injury to
anyone. (4) It is not necessary to make
brick on the land where the clay may be
found. (5) The making of brick was not
the necessary and natural result of the development of the defendant's land.
Had the injury been caused while the
land was actually being developed, probably the Sanderson case would apply.
The facts in Huckenstine's Appeal, 70
Pa. 102, are similar to those now before us.
In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendant from burning brick on his
lands and the Court said in refusing the injunction: "After a careful and full consideration of the case we are compelled to
reverse the decree of the Court of Common
Pleas and dismiss the bill of the plaintiff
at his cost; but, without predjudice to any
right they may have to recover in an action at law."
The defendant also contends that where
a man manufactures the products of his
land into finished articles on the land
where the material is produced, he is not
liable for injuries done to his neighbor's
lands if his business is a lawful business
and conducted with care.
We do not concede this to be the law.
It is no defence to say that the business is
a lawful business and has been conducted
with care when the neighbor's lands have
been injured in consequence of the business
carried on there. Bamford v. Turnley, 9
Jur. U. S. 377. The escape of gas and
smoke might cause a man to lose his farm,
or might be compelled to lease it, simply
because the business which brought about
the loss was a lawful business and carried
on carefully.
No man's property can be taken directly
or indirectly without compensation under
the law of this State. Houck v. Pipe Line,
153 Pa. 375. Hence there are cases, and a
great many of them, where the defendant
is held liable in damages although his
business is lawful and carefully conducted.
Robb v. Carneige, 145 Pa. 324. Houck v.
Pipe Line, &upra.
It is true that in the cases above cited,
the things that did the injury were brought
on the land, but we are of the opinion that
a recovery would have been allowed in
these cases, especially in Robb v. Carneige,
if the coal was mined on the land.
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We believe that the extension of the
doctrine of Sanderson v. Coal Co., to cases
of the kind now before us would be attended with serious consequences.
A man might be the owner of a bed of
clay which was surrounded on all sides by
large wheat fields of other persons, and to
allow him to make this clay into bricks,
and by the burning process destroy the
crops of all his neighbors without any
liability on his part, would be a cruel
wrong which the law will not permit.
Judgment for plaintiff for fifty dollars.

the State; it must be done where the coal
is; it cannot be done without acidulating
the water of the natural streams in the
neighborhood.
Therefore, the riparian
owners shall not even have damages. The
mine owner shall be permitted to mine,
for his own advantage, though he destroys
the property of others, without compensation to them. The constitution of the
State forbids the public from directly taking, injuring ordestroying the property of
another, without indemnifying the latter,
but the mine owner, because his business
is useful to the public, may prosecute it at
ALBERTSON, J.
the expense of his neighbors' property
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
rights, without giving a compensation.
The question presented in this case is
One might have supposed that if the busisimple. Can Enstein convert the clay
nes of mining could not be carried on
found on his land into bricks, by a prowithout encroaching on th6 property of
cess which involves injury to the corn
others, the profits of the business should
grown on Thorpe's land?
in some equitable way be divided between
The injury is caused by smoke and gas.
those whose property was thus, without
It does not appear that the use of a process
their consent, made to assist, and the mine
which leads to the emission of smoke and
owner. The interest of the public would
gas is negligent, nor that by practicable
bave, it is true, forbidden an injunction
means such smoke and gas could, if
against the taking, but for that very reagenerated, be prevented from reaching
son, the owner whose property was, despite
Thorpe'sland. We shall assume that En- lils non-consent, made to contribute to the
stein could notturn hisclay into brick"s, on
business, should, in the form of damages,
these premises, without the generation of
have been requitted for the contribution.
the gas and smoke, and that, these being
In railroad cases, and other cases ingenerated, he could not restrain them
volving eminent domain, a similar failure
within the boundaries of his own premises
to recover adequate compensation may be
It will follow that either Enstein must abnoticed. From the initial damages for the
stain from making brick out of clay upon
taking are excluded diminutions of value,
these premises, or that Thorpe must suffer
arising from sundry causes, and for these
a total or partial loss of the crops which,
diminutions the recovery of damages in
otherwise, he would be able to raise.
later actions of trespass is also excluded.
Vaguely speaking, one man has no right
The principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
to produce by the pursuit of a business, inv. Sanderson was not so satisfactory that
jury to another. The exceptions, however,
there has been any anxiety to apply it to
are innumerable.
There are cases in
other cases. The court of equity would
which, though injury fo" one man is
probably not enjoin Enstein from making
wrought by the business of another, equity
his bricks on the land whence he dug the
will not restrain its prosecution, but courts
clay, but the court of law would not allow
of law will give compensation. There are the chancellor's reasons to induce the withothers in which the person injured can
holding of damages also. The business, it
neither secure an injunction nor even damwould say, is respectable, useful. lawful.
ages. He must meekly and patriotically
It cannot well be conducted elsewhere than
suffer because his injurer is in some'sense
where the clay is found. It cannot well
serving the public, by the business from
be sci conducted that smoke and gas will
which the injury springs, or because he is
not escape upon the adjacent lands and inonly one of some dozens or hundreds who jure flhe crops thereon. Nevertheless, if
suffer a like injury. Of the latter case,
this use of Thorpe's land, in the manufacPa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, is a
ture of the bricks, is necessary, Enstein
specimen. Coal mining is very useful to
must pay for it. Enstein is not forbidden
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thus to dominate Thorpe's land; but,
when he does so, he must compensate
Thorpe. This is a sensible view. It would
be a pity to prevent Enstein's clay being
made into bricks, because, by so doing,
Thorpe's land would cease to raise wheat,
but it is equally a pity to prevent Thorpe's
land from raising wheat in order that Enstein's clay might be turned into bricks.
Wheat growing and brick making are both
laudable, useful, indispensable avocations,
and the use of land for both purposes is
equally commendable, but there is no more
reason for making Thorpe's land servient
to Enstein's avocation, than for making
Enstein's servient to Thorpe's.
The servitude which Thorpe implies is a
passive servitude. Enstein must refrain
from using his land in certain ways, because, in so doing, he sends material substances over and upon Thorpe's land. Enstein must simply refrain from sending
these noxious substances upon Thorpe's
land. The servitude which Enstein desires to establish, is an active one. He
wishes the right to send these poisonous
particles over Thorpe's land, even without
making compensation for it. It is enough
to concede to him the exemption from prohibition thus to subjugate Thorpe's land,
without, in addition, consenting that he
shall subjugate it wholly for his own advantage, and without any indemnity to
Thorpe.
The cases cited by the learned court below sustain its conclusion. Cf. Gavigan v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 186 Pa. 604.
BOLTON vs. IRONS.
BReal property-Dower,lien of-The effect
of a sale of the land upon the lien and on
unpaidinstalments.
STATEMENT OF THECASE.
A died seised ofa farm. His heirs joined
in a conveyance to B, subject to the payment to C, widow of A, of annually the
interest of J the purchase money during
her life and at her death to'the heirs of A.
B subsequently died and proceedings in
partition were had on his estate and the
farm conveyed to him by A was allotted
to D, a child of B, and a recognizance had
for I of the valuation money, the interest
of which is payable to E, widow of B, for
life and at her death to her children.
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D sells the farm to H, who fails to pay
the interest to C. Proceedings were instituted to collect it and a judgment recovered. I purchased at the sale on this
judgment; an action brought by E to
recover the interest secured by the recognizance; I claims that he took the
land discharged of all liens.
KEELOR and CLAYCOMB for plaintiff.
A release of dower must be made by an
instrument under seal. Gray v. McCune,
23 Pa. 447; Murphy v. Borland, 92 Pa. 86;
Van Strochs estate, 5 Kulp 389; Gourley
v. Kenley, 66 Pa. 270.
CoRE and WATSON for defendant.
A sale under an order of an Orphans"
Court divests dower. Scot v. Croasdale,
1 Yeates 75; Mitchell ' Mitchell, 8 Pa.
126; Grant v. Hook, 13 S. and R. 262;
Helfrich v. Ohermyer, 15 Pa. 113.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Dower is that interest or estate which is
provided by the law for the widow out of
the reai property of the husband at common law, and generally in this country it
is an estate for life in one-third of his
lands, tenements, and hereditaments.
The dower right of a widow cannot be defeated unless she commits such an action
that will be a bar to her recovery for dower.
Her dower right may also be defeated" in
the following ways: (1) byjoiningin a deed
with her husband; (2) by obtaining a divorce; (3) by loss of the husband's seisin,
whether by the assertion of a paramount title ,the breach of a condition, or the expiration of the limitation. In the case at bar,
the widow, E, has done nothing to bar
her right to dower, but the question before us for decision, is, whether or not, I
takes the land free from all liens. After
thoroughly examining the cases in this
state we find that there are none quite
similar to the one at bar, but the law relating to dower is the same. If a recognizance or other collateral security has been
taken for the widow's interest, she may
maintain the appropriate action thereupon. Myers v. Brodbeck, 110 Pa. 198.
The widow may recover the interest on
the money charged on the land by distress or otherwise, as rents are recoverable.
Davidson's Appeal, 95 Pa. 394; Heller's
Appeal, 116 Pa. 534. And again, she may
maintain an action of assumpsit or debt,
against a terre-tenant, for arrears of dower.
Deifendefer v. Eshleman, 113 Pa. 305;
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Lerch v. Snyder, 112 Pa. 161; The Borough
of York v. Welsh, 117 Pa. 174. In the case
at bar C, widow of A, recovered judgment
because her interest was not paid. She had
no recognizance bond or any collateral security. A recognizance is not necessary to
make a lien for dower. A widow's dower
right follows the land no matter whether
sold at sheriff's sale or private sale. A purchaser is presumed to have notice of such
right of widow. Dr. Trickett in his work
on "Liens" distinctly states and cites cases
as authority, that a lien follows the land,
and where a sheriff's sale takes place prior
.to widow's death, the purchaser takes subject to the duty of paying the interest on
that sum to the widow. Trickett on
Liens, vol. 3, page 542; Hebner v. Shirk,
2 Walker 165. A widow whose interest in
her husband's estate is secured by a recognizance may enforce the payment of interest due her, (Act of March 29, 1832 P.
L.), by distress or otherwise as rents in
this commonwealth are recovered. Evans
and Shearer v. Ross, 107 Pa. 231; De,
Haven v. Bartholmen, 57 Pa. 156. After
a careful search of the subject of "Widow's
Dower," both at common law and in Pennsylvania, we cannot find any thing in
support of I's claim, that he took free from
all liens. We are of the opinion lhat E is
entitled to her one-third interest of the
purchase money payable annually. Judgment is accordingly granted in favor of E.

L. B. C.

DELANEY, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The charge in favor of the first widow of
the first decedent,was made by the deed under which the land was conveyed to Bolton.
When at the death of Bolton, partition of
his estate was made, the land was allotted
to his son David, who entered into a recognizance for one-third of the valuation,
of which the interest was to be annually
paid to Mrs. Bolton. David sold the land
to Holmes. He omitted to pay the instalments due to the first widow, who thereupon sued him, obtained judgment, and
caused a judicial sale of the land to Irons.
Irons now fails to pay the interest due to
the second widow, Mrs. Bolton, contending that her dower was divested by the sale
at which iebecame purchaser. The learned court below has rejected his contention,
and entered judgment for the plaintiff.

We are unable to reach the same conclusion.
A sale on a lien later than dower, will
discharge the arrears of dower then due,
but not the dower. Plumer's Appeal, 11
W. N. C. 144; 3 Liens, 541. A sale on a
judgment or decree for an instalment of
dower will discharge the instalments then
mature, but not the dower itself, nor instalments thereafter to fall due. Jones'
Appeal, 14 W. N. 0.813; Tospon v. Sipes,
116 Pa. 588.
The question before us is different. It
is whether a sale for an instalment of an
earlier dower, will cut off, divest the later
dower.
The principle is perhaps universal, that
a sale necessary to secure satisfaction of an
earlier lien, divests all later liens. Thus a
sale on second mortgage will divest the
third mortgage, though not the first. If
the sale on'the second mortgage were subject to the third, the third would in fact
be preferred to the second. The purchaser
would pay only the price of the land diminished by the first and third mortgages.
The second mortgage would take only
what was left. If no purchaser would pay
more than the sum of the first and third
mortgages, there could be'no sale.
It matters not whether the sale is for the
-whole of the first mortgage or only for one
of several bonds secured by it. The sale
would divest the whole of the second mortgage, and the proceeds would be applied
pi-o ratato all the bonds, as well those not
sued as that on which the suit was founded.
Nor can it matter that the first charge
is a dower, and that a sale for an instalment will 'not divest -the dower itself.
Both the dower principal and the annual
instalments are charges prior in virtue to
a later dower, or other charge. If the land
cannot be sold on a judgment for annual
instalments, except as saddled with a later
dower, the first widow might be precluded
from ever obtaining payment. Should the
land become worth no more than the second charge, no purchaser would buy it.
To the dower fund was originally attached
a right to appropriate the whole value of
the land to the widow and heirs. If a second dower can be created which shall
cleave inseparably to that land, the first
dower now attaches virtually only to the
difference between the whole value of the
land and the second dower charge.
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We know not for how much Irons bought
the land. He had a right to assume that
all charges subsequent to the first widow's
dower would be divested, and that the
price bid by him would represent its full
value less anterior charges, and the principal of the first -dower. If, after paying
the instalments then due on the first dower, there remained anything, it was the
duty of the owner of the second dower
fund to see that this remainder was properly invested, in order that it might yield
an annual payment to Mrs. Bolton. To
this remainder, and not to Irons, the purchaser, it was necessary to look. It follows
that Irons holds the land free from Mrs.
Bolton's dower, and he cannot be compelled to pay the instalments falling due
since his purchase.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for
the defendant.
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tions of the parent at the time of making
the transfer are admissible in evidence.
Frey v. Heydt, 116 Pa. 601 ; Weaver's Appeal, 63 Pa. 309; Harris' Appeal, 2 Grant
304.
LONGDOTTOm and YEAGLEY for defendant.
An absolute transfer of property by a
parent to a child is presumed in the first'
instance to be a gift. Kerley's Appeal,
109 Pa. 41; Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. 119.
The declarations of the parent are inadmissible unless shown to be part of the
resgestae. Frey v. Heydt, 116 Pa. 601.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
An absolute transfer of property by a
parent to a child, in the absence of explanatory circumstances, is presumed in the
first instance to be a gift. An advancement is simply a gift wilh a condition attached and when such a condition was not
expressly annexed by the donor, the burden is upon him who alleges that one was
intended.
In discharge of this duty, the plaintiff
BROWN vs. DIX'S ADMINISTRATOR.
offered certain declarations of Mrs. Dix,
Decedents' estates-Advancements, how the donor, made subsequently to the date
distinguished from gifts-Declarations of the transaction. They were objected to
on the ground that they were not part of
of decedent as evidence of either
the res gestae.
Advancement is a question of intent and
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
such intent must be proven to have been
Mrs. Dix died in 1902 leaving four sons
present in the mind of the donor at the
and daughters; and children of a deceased
time of the transfer. Merkel's Appeal, 89
daughter. In 1899 Mrs. Dix gave to each
Pa. 340; Frey v. Heydt, 116 Pa. 601. Deof her four living children $10,000, or the
clarations of the parent at the time or withequivalent in real estate. Soon after this
in such a period thereafter as would conshe told one of her grand-daughters, in
stitute them part of the res gestae are adthe presence of one of her daughters, that
missible to prove the nature of the gift inshe intended all to have the same, "that
tended. Merkel's Appeal, supra;Frey v.
the grand-children were to have what
Heydt, suipra. The cases do hold that subwould have gone to their mother, if she
sequent declarations are admissible to corhad been living." Also told her sister
roborate the acts of the donor at the time
that she intended to give the grand-chilof the trafisaction when such acts themdren the same amount, but she didn't
selves indicate that an advancement was
want to give it to them until they needed
intended. See Merkel's Appeal, supra,and
it. That they were then too young.
Frey v. Heydt, supra. No such acts, howThe administrator claims she intended it
ever, are present in this case and no dea gift. Brown, guardian of the children,
cision has been brought to our notice in
brings this action to recover the $10,000 due
which it was held that the declarations of
them, claiming it was an advancement.
a
donor made after the transfer of property
JoNEs and EBBERT for plaintiff.
by him are admissible to impeach what
Whether a transfer of property is a gift
otherwise was an absolute gift. As beor an advancement is a question of intention of the parent at the time the transfer
tween the donor and donee the rights
was made.. Merkel's Appeal, 89 Pa. 340;
of the latter are as perfect as those of a purEshelman's Estate, 135 Pa. 160; Miller's
ctlaser for value and it would not be conAppeal, 40 Pa. 57; Lawson's Appeal, 23
tended that a purchaser's title or rights in
Pa. 85.
goods could be in any way impeached by
To establish this intention the declara-
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the ex parte declarations of the vendor.
The fact that the first declaration was
made in the presence of one of the donees
does not affect the admissibility of the
same since it was not assented to and assent, which renders the declaration in effect an admission by the donee, is the only
ground upon which it would be admissible. Harris's Appeal, 2 Grant 804.
Again, the identity of the daughter
being undisclosed, it would be impossible
to charge anyone of them with the effect
of the declaration.
The second declaration, in fact, is irrelevant for the purpose offered. It was not
a statement of the donor's state of mind at
the time of the transaction, tending to
throw light upon the same but merely the
declaration, of a present intention to give
the grand-children a certain sum when
they needed it.
Neither of the declarations, therefore,
are competent evidence.
The plaintiff further contends thatjudging the amount and character of the gift.
an advancement will be presumed. The
facts do not disclose the value of Mrs.
Dix's estate atthe time or at any othertime.
All that is stated is that $10,000 was given
by her to fourofher children. Although the
amount given to each was large in comparison to the average person's estate, can we
safely presume that Mrs. Dix acted unnaturally and gave to her children an amount
which in proportion to her estate was so
large that an advancement would be the
only safe inference? We think not. To
hold, in the absence of knowledge of the
value of Mrs. Dix's estate, that she intended to make an advancement, would
be to attribute to her conduct unbecoming
the average parent, who does not give to a
child an amount which, in view of his estate, is so large that the law will presume
that an advancement was intended.
The reason upon which the rule is based
is the best answer to the request for its application in this case.
Then as to the nature of the subject matter of the gift. A grant of land by a
parent tola child isprimafaoiean advancement: Lewis's Appeal, 127 Pa. 127. The
facts state that Mrs. Dix "gave to each
of her living children $10,000, or the equivalent in real estate." What part of the
$10,000 represented realty? Unless we can

discover a positive answer to this question
from the facts themselves, the presumption cannot be raised. The facts do not
contain it.
Upon no ground can there be a recovery
by the plaintiff.
Judgment for defendant.
GIBE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMdE COURT.

We see no error in the judgment of the
learned court below. This is an action in
the common pleas against the administrator to recover an advancement which the
deceased is alleged to have intended to
make, but did not make. There is no
precedent for such on action. The disappointed grand-children may, in"the distribution of the fund in the administrator's hands in the Orphans' Court, insist
that the advancements made to the four
children shall be regarded as anticipatory
payments pro lanto of their shares of the
estate, and that thus the portions of the
money actually undergoing distribution,
to be paid to the grand-children, shall be
enlarged. There is no other remedy.
Conveyance, of land, gratuitously by a
parent or by another at his instance, and
for a consideration furnished by him, are,
in the absence of a different intention,
taken to be advancements. The evidence
unfortunately does not show how large a
part of the alleged advancement was in
Ihe form of land, nor to which of the four
children land was conveyed. We cannot
find from it, therefore, which of the four
children was advanced, nor -to what extent any of them was advanced.
The intention to advance must exist
when the transfer of property to a child
by the parent is made. The declaration
of Mrs. Dix after the gift to the four children, that she intended all the children to
have the same, the children of the deceased
daughter taking what would have gone to
their mother, could not well qualify the gift
already made. Further discussion of the
case is unnecessary. We are satisfied that
it has been correctly disposed of by the
learned court below.
Judgment affirmed.
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MINOR vs. IMPERIAL CO.

R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. 372. Agent acted
without the scope of his authority. hence
company is not liable. Clark on Corp.
Trespass-Malicious prosecution-Proba- the
p. 526 ; R. R. Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394.

ble cause-Exemplarydamages-Liability of masterfor actions of servant.
STATEMENT. OF THE CASE.

Minor purchased articles at the store of
the defendant, paying for them. They
were sent to his home in the defendant's
wagon, the driver being instructed to collect the money before delivery. The goods
were handed to Minor with the statement
that the price, $4.23, was to be paid.
Minor replied that he had paid. The
driver declaring that his orders were nt
to leave the goods unless they were p.id
for, demanded them back. Minor refusing
to deliver them, and excitedly resisting
the driver, the latter went off and made
information against Minor for larceny.
Brought before the justice he was committed for trial. Subsequently on habeas
corpus he was discharged.
The president of the company appeared
at the hearing and stated the facts, dedaring that a mistake of a servant of the
company had been made in directing the
driver to collect.
This action is brought for a malicious
prosecution and the court allowed the jury
to assess vindictive damages.
ALBERTSON and HILLYER for the plain-

Iiff.
Punitive damages are assessable in Pa.
Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa. 424; Heiling v.
Henderson, 161 Pa. 553.
Release of defendant by habeas corpus
is sufficient termination of the prosecution. Zebley v. Storey, 117 Pa. 478.
Malice may be inferred from want of
probable cause. Bigelow on Torts, pp. 107;
Deitz v. Longfitt, 63 Pa. 234; Bunor v.
Dunlap, 94 Pa. 239.
Belief in a right to do a certain act will
not shield a party from punitive damages,
if the act is done in a wanton or reckless
manner. A. & E. Eno. of Law 2nd Ed.,
vol. 12 pp. 25; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn.
529.
DIVELY and KNAPPENBERGER for the

defendant.
Probable cause for the institution of a
criminal proceeding is the existence of
facts sufficient to induce in the mind of a
reasonable man, a belief in the guilt of the
accused.
Cooper v. Hart & Co., 147 Pa. 594; Smith
v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419. Excessive fraud, wantonness, or other circumstances to call for
exemplary damages, do not appear. R.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
This was an action of trespass to recover
damages for a malicious prosecution instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff.
The first question that presents itself is:
is this company liable for the conduct of
this servant, and was this servant acting
in the scope of the company's authority,
and was he clothed with the right to pursue
the course that he did? If he was clothed
with this right expressly or impliedly then
the company is liable. The principle of
the rule is stated byAndrews, J., Rounds v.
Delaware & L. W. 1. Co'. 64 N. Y. 129, as
follows: "Where authority is conferred to
act for another without special limitation,
it carries with it, by implication, authority
to do all things necessary to its execution;
and when it involves the discretion of the
servant of the use of force towards or
against another, the use of such discretion
or force is a part of the thing authorized,
and, when exercised, becomes, as to third
persons, the discretion of the act of the
master. The master who puts theservant
in a place of trust or responsibility, orcommits to him the management of his business or the care of his business or the care
of his property, is justly held responsible
when the servant, through lack of judgmeat or discretion or from infirmity of
temper, or under the influence of passion,
aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict line of his
duty or authority, and inflicts an unjustifiable injury upon another."
To sustain an action for a malicious prosecution there are three essential elements
necessary to be established or the action
will fall. There must be (1) a termination of the prosecution; (2) want of probable cause; (3) malice.
First, there was such a termination of
the prosecution as would allow the defendant to maintain this action. Abell v.
Charles, Brightly 131, holds that a discharge on habeas corpus puts an end to a
criminal prosecution, so as to enable the
defendant therein to maintain an action
for malicious prosecution. Zerby v. Story,
117 Pa. 489.
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Second, there was want of probable
cause. Probable cause, is a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily
prudent man in believing the party guilty
of the offense. Probable cause is shown
for a prosecution for larceny, where it appears that the person accused has taken the
prosecutor's property and is unable to give
a reasonable excuse for not returning it.
Mitchel v. Logan, 172 Pa. 349; McClafferty
v. Philip, 151 Pa. 86. Observe the conduct
of this driver when he delivered the goods
to the plaintiff, and demanded the money
for them. The plaintiff told him that he
had paid for them, but the driver denied.
Simply on the ground that a servant had
given him orders to collect the money for
the goods, he demands the goods back
which the plaintiff refused to hand over
but deliberately and excitedly resisted the
driver as any man would have done under
the circumstances. The plaintiff had as
much right to claim the goods on the
ground that he had paid for them, as the
driver had to believe that they were not
paid for and that he still had a right to
hold them for the company. The facts of
the case suggest that the plaintiff had
more right to hold the goods, as surely a
man is conscious of his own acts, while the
driver had only the instructions of a servant.
The duty of the driver was to return to
the store and ascertain if the goods were
paid for, and learn if the plaintiff was the
rightful owner of the goods, and then and
there have settled all controversy, as a
prudent man would have done, but instead of so doing he hurries off to a justice
and makes an information against the
plaintiff for larceny. The defendant was
not justified in pursuing the course that
he did when he had nosubstantial ground
for his conduct.
And the conclusion is
that there is want of probable cause.
Third, there was malice, and this point
does not need any discussion, as malice
need not be proved; it may be inferred
from want of probable cause. Abrahams
v. Cooper, 81 Pa. 235; Leahey v. March,
155 Pa. 458.
The court allowed the jury to assess
vindictive damages. Lake Shore & Mich.
S. R'y v. Rosenzurg, 113 Pa. 535, holds
that a corporation is liable for exemplary

damages for the acts of its servant done
within the scope of his authority, under
circumstances which would give such
right to the plaintiffas against the servant,
were the suit against, him instead of the
company.
Exemplary damages, are allowed only where the act complained of
had been committed willfully and maliciously, or, in the absence of actual malice.
and where it has been committed under
circumstances of violence, oppression, outrage, or wanton recklessness. Nagle v.
Mullison, 34 Pa. 48.
Was it proper for the court to give the
jury the right to decide the question of
vindictive damages? In Amer v. Longstreth, 10 Barr 145, Justice Bell said that
in an action for trespass, the jury are not
confined to the actual damage sustained;
they may go beyond that, if the case shows
a wanton invasion ofthe plaintiff's rights,
or of any circumstances of aggravation or
outrage. This is for thejury to determine,
and, within reasonable bounds, it is a
matter within their control.
Upon no
principle of law or equity, is the jury permitted to go beyond compensation in
damages unless in cases of gross oppression or aggravation when the jury may
asses vindictive damages. Rossv. Story,
1 Barr 190. The jury and not the court
are to determine whether it is a proper
case for exemplary damages. Nagle v.
Mullison, supra.
Therefore, the opinion of the court is
that the jury was properly allowed to assess vindictive damages.
MOWRY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The articles purchased by Minor, were
conveyed to his home by the wagon of the
defendant, the driver of which was instructed to collect the money before delivery. It was his task then, when he
discovered that Minor, after receiving the
goods, was not going to pay for them, to
demand them back, and possibly to take
them. Minor's resistance prevented the
retaking of them. Thereupon the driver
went off and made information against
Minor. In doing so are we to understand
that he represented the company?
There is no affinity between the ordinary
work of a wagon-driver and that of instituting criminal prosecutions for his em-
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ployer. The company had not expressly
authorized him to do so. He had not on
previous occasions, so far as appears, done
so with the subsequent approbation of the
company. The making of the information
would not be a reasonable means of his
recovering the goods, and discharging his
duty to bring them back, should the price
not be paid. How then can his act be attributed to the defendant? In Central
Railway Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394, Clark,
Corporations, p. 526, it was held that a
street railway company was not liable for
a malicious prosecution of a passenger even
by its president and superintendent, on a
charge of dropping a lead nickel in the
fare box, unless he had express authority,
or his act was ratified by the company.
In Craver v. Bloomingdale, 171 N. Y. 439,
the jury were permitted to find the defendant liable, because there was evidence
from the conduct of the business through
the intervention of the driver, etc., of his
authority to do the act. We think it was
error to allow the jury to attribute to the
defendant, the act of the driver.
Nor are we convinced that it was proper
to permit the jury to assess vindicatory
damages. The driver was misinformed,
through the mistake of his employer. He
was not bound to believe Minor's declaration that he had paid for the goods. He,
probably, had no knowledge of Minor,
and it was not absurd for him to suspect
that the latter was lying in order tojustify
his retention of the goods without paying
for them. Minor had excitedly resisted
the driver, when he demanded the goods
back. He should have allowed them to
be taken back, or should have paid for
them a second time, and awaited rectification of the error, when he should have a
conference with the defendant. He knew
that the delivery of the goods by the driver
was only on the condition that they
should be paid for, and he had no right to
retain them, if unwilling to comply with
that condition. In the face of the conduct
of Minor, and with his own conviction
that Minor had not paid for the goods, it
is not strange that the driver believed
that Minor was intending to secure them
without paying for them.
It is true that the jury is to say whether
the facts call for exemplary damages; but
a precondition to their decision that they

do is that there shall be sufficient evidence
of malice, fraud, outrage, oppression or
vindictiveness on the part of the driver.
We fail to find such evidence.
Judgment reversed.

JOHN DOE vs. ROBERT REESE AND
GEORGE BLANK, AUDITORS OF
FELL BOROUGH.
Borough officers-Collateralattack of a de
facto official's acts-Such attack notperrnitted-Reportof boroughauditors confirmed-atificationof acts done in the
absence of a quorum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Fell borough consisted of three wards,
and there were three councilmen elected
from eqch ward. March 5, 1901, when
the council met to organize, there were
nine of the councilmen present before the
meeting opened. Four of them left before the roll was called, and five of them
answered the roll call. Immediately after
roll call and before any business was done,
one of the five left the room and went
home, leaving four of the councilmen
present.
The remaining councilmen proceeded to
organize, claiming that as the one that
left had answered to roll call, they bad a
quorum, and by instructions of the remainlug councilmen, the clerk marked the
councilmen that had left and gone home,
as voting in the affirmative on all questions and a full quota of borough officers
were elected.
At the next meeting of council, the full
number were present, and one of the councilmen that had been absent the previous
meeting, moved that the proceedings of
the previous meeting be ratified. This
motion passed by an unanimous vote.
Business proceeded in the regular order,
bills were paid, and the auditors reported
as having audited the affairs and finding
them correct. John Doe excepts to this report on the ground that the organization
was illegal and the motion to ratify it did
not correct it, consequently all business
done was illegal.
GERBER and DEVER for the exceptants.
BRENNAN and SHERBINE contra.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Before the meeting of council, on March
5, 1901, nine councilmen were present.
Four of them left before roll-call, and five
answered to the call. Immediately after
roll-call, one of these five left the room and
went home. There remained, therefore,
but four councilmen present.
Four are not a majority of nine, and the
presence of a majority of the nine was
necessary to the transaction of any business. It may have been the duty of the
other five to remain, but this duty is not.
the equivalent of actually remaining.
The borough is not represented by but
four councilmen, and acts of these four
are not its acts
It seems that the secretary has mentioned in the minutes the fact that five
answered to the roll-call. He has not
mentioned the subsequent withdrawal of
one of them. On the contrary he falsified
the record by noting that this in fact absent member voted affirmatively on all
questions.
The four members, claiming, with the
member who had left after roll-call, to be
a quorum, proceeded to elect the borough
officers, a treasurer, a secretary, etc. The
four corporally present, and the ghostly
fifth, unanimously elected A for the
first of these offices and B for the second.
At the next meeting of council, all being
present, one of those who had been absent
at, the former meeting, moved that the
proceedings of that meeting be ratified.
The law prescribes no formalities for the
election of these officers. Formal nomination is unnecessary. The voting may be
viva voce or by ballot, as the council may
choose. Though the time prescribed for
organization had elapsed, it was not impossible effectively to elect. Commonwealth v. Steele, 2 North 1. To "ratify"
the election to office of A, would be a vir-

tual election of him to that office. Whatever imperfection inhered in the original
election would be made innocuous by a
second election, in which, too, the vote
was unanimous. A is the treasurer of the
borough of Fell.
But, suppose that he has not been regularly elected. He has nevertheless been
chosen, first by four, and secondly by the
unanimous ratification of their choice.
Let this be an irregular designation to the
office. It is nevertheless, a designation.
A has entered upon the duties of the office. He is a de facto, if not a de jure
treasurer. As such, he has paid bills
drawn upon him. It is a well settled
principle that the acts of a defacto officer
cannot be collaterally attacked. Shartzer
v. School District, 90 Pa. 192; Campbell
v. Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 344; Commonwealth v. Valsalka, 181 Pa. 17; King v.
Phila. Co., 154 Pa. 160; Keyser v. McKeisan, 2 R. 139; Clark v. Commonwealth,
29 Pa. 129.
What else than a collateral attack is attempted here? The treasurer has submitted his account to the borough auditors,
and they have approved of his payments.
The decision of the auditors will not estop
any citizen from subsequently contesting
A's tenure of the office, if right to contest
they would otherwise have. So long as A
is acting as treasurer he should account to
the auditors, and no appeal can succeed
which denies his right to credits, while
holding him subject to debits.
The proper way to determine A's right
to the office is a quo warranto. It cannot
be inquired into by the auditors or by the
Common Pleas on appeals from their report.
The exceptions to the report of the borough auditors are dismissed, and the report
is approved and confirmed.

